Tuesday, October 30, 2007

My Tiara Was Stolen and Stuffed Down Someone's Trousers

Y'all, we were at the Cobb Energy Centre in Atlanta last night. Andit was one of the- oddest- concert experiences I think I have everhad. I saw Eurythmics on the Peacetour on GMA with a bunch offanlist members, Peacetour, and Annie Lennox on Bare and with Sting. So not my first experience. By the way, I wore an "ExecutiveTransvestite" outfit-it's Annie, right? She should appreciatethat. It's fine if you go to the concert in your Gap duds butr espect those of us who have some imagination. And my husband(small black man) wore his punk outfit.

Now let me first say this: Annie's concert goers seem to be skewing older and older- like for the last tour, they were about her age, now they're roughly her parents' age. I saw at least one person with a WALKER, at least one person with a CANE, and a bunch of old men wearing their trousers round their nipples, and those sort of dorky uncoordinated clothes? The kind that almost match, but not really? I mean, her next tour is going to have to be in retirement homes. They're going to have Laurel Oaks buses pull up outside, and a special Dementia sufferers (stop it, I do not suffer from Dementia, I enjoy every minute of it) area and sell Ensure and hearing aid batteries instead of wine. This is like, weird, because she got famous at about 28, so you figure that someone who was a teenage vidiot in '82 would be roughly 40 now, right? Not- that much older than I. Certainly not much older than Trey. But y'all, her audience was like the Colonnade, the gay and the gray. Alex should ask the members of his church who went to the concert. Are these people stealing their children's CD collections? Where do they hear about her? Do they realise she dressed up as Elvis for the '84 Grammys?

And I do not understand who it is that buys concert ticketsnowadays and where they get their manners? Because Carina Round was FANTASTIC- a very gracious, lovely, talented young lady with a really incredible voice- and for someone to shout "Where's Annie?"in the middle of her performance- is so wrong. No matter how awfulthe opening band is- even if they're playing "Beer Barrel Polka" on kazoo and theremin- they got picked, you didn't, respect that. Someone, somewhere decided that they had the requisite talent to be there. Not you. And she was excellent! Well, sort of. She needs to learn to play more than one note on the guitar, she sang very well, but without- like melody? And she played that lesbian kind of music which requires only two or three chords strummed over and over again. But she did have a fabulous voice.

Also if you go to a rock concert- And ok, Annie draws older fans than say, Kid Rock,- but if you want to sit- in your chair- througha rock concert- buy the DVD and watch it at home. It's not the Opera, it's not the symphony, it's not the morgue- if you aren't into dancing at a concert, you've missed the whole point of a live performance. Stay home if you can't get up and get down. I mean, really. We nearly got ARRESTED for dancing during the concert, they sent like 5 police officers; were going to ARREST us- and finally ended up making us move. If you don't dance, you're too old. K? I mean, Annie wants you to get live. These people were, like, really OLD though. They probably had Grandchildren my age.

So we ended up in a box near the stage- which was closer but at a bad angle- in which we could dance, and of course we were dancing fools through the entire thing. If you do not dance to "Little Bird"- you too old. Do whatever it is old people do, like not go to concerts. Is it too much to ask for a venue like this to have a roped off fun area? I was like Epater les bourgeois! Dancing at a rock concert is now a truly Revolutionary act! I wonder if like,Van Halen fans are this boring nowadays. If I go to Morrissey- are his fans going to SIT through the concert and get mad when you dance?

I cannot tell you how seriously angry I am about that.

And then the man in the box next to us snatched my tiara off of my head and hid it in his TROUSERS and refused to give it back. (I am not making this up! Not like the house being infested with wiggers, that I made up) I did eventually get it back though, so nyaah to Alex, who is thinking, Serves you right! But remember last time I wore an Executive Transvestite outfit - this one is a DIFFERENT Executive Transvestite outfit- the blonde twins licked my nipple. We did not want to make any more trouble- the cops were watching us the whole time lest we- well, I don't know. Commit some kind of dancing sin. Perhaps they thought we were going to have sex right there in the box, although why someone would think that- I don't know- we evidenced having pulses at the concert and brain activity so I suppose - you KNOW what dancing leads to, don't you? They must have watched "Footloose" too many times.

So that was another element of strangeness. I'm like, what is NOT going to happen? You really do NOT expect this at an Annie Lennox concert. We expect her fans to be more-respectful and dedicated? I just wish her fans could be as classy and engaged as she is. These people were as mousy and staid as people watching professional golf. But she was fantastic, and very nice about signing afterwards. For those of y'all who haven't been yet to one of her shows, they're like legally obligated to come out and say go away, she's refusing to sign, she's already left, etc. Just go wait by the buses. It's just that the venue didn't make us feel- welcome or appreciated as FANS. I mean, we're Eurythmics/Annie Lennox fans, we're less menacing than bouquets of flowers. I daresay everyone in attendance had a 401(K) and a 10:00 bedtime. I mean, like everyone in the audience probably had a Camry with an "Ask Me About My GrandChildren" sticker.

Monday, October 29, 2007

Halloween!

Y'all, Alex has not yet sent me the pictures from Halloween


This year Jason's party sucked. You know a party is bad when the host leaves in the middle of it to go to another party somewhere near Lake Lanier. The highlight of the party was that Cathy got drunk and flirted with a guy in an orange jumpsuit young enough to be her son. I was hoping that they would have enough to drink to- Let's say for him to end up with lipstick marks around- you know.

Daniel, when I recounted this story the next day was appalled.



What kind of friend are you, he demanded, when you wanted your friend to get drunk and have sex with a guy she doesn't know? That's a recipe for disaster.



No, it isn't, because what Cathy needs BADLY is a good dose of Vitamins C, D, and M.

If you want to know what those vitamins are, I will be more than happy to tell you.

At least Orange Jumpsuit wasn't MARRIED, as far as I know. She needs to loosen up and stop pretending I'm her boyfriend- like she whines and cries and plagues me to go do things with her. There are plenty of guys out there for her. But: if someone is roughly her age and handsome and well to do and so forth, they're NOT single. She really wants a boyfriend but her standards are ridiculous. Most people would be THRILLED to have younger guys hitting on them. She continuously whines at me about wanting a boyfriend but then when she gets the opportunity she doesn't take it. Ooo and she annoyed me so much Saturday. She doesn't get the concept that people have other things to do. And then she made Trey have a snit all weekend.

Y'all need to investigate something called "Furry." I am just now learning about this, so apparently I am very late to the party, as in all the punch has been drunk, the streamers have come down, and all the cool people have gone off to make out late, but this is something in which people dress up- willingly! As in, they are not forced to! like furry cartoon animals (Mickey Mouse, etc.) And there are a whole BUNCH of people who apparently do this, and they have sex? Like a Star Trek convention only- more eccentric.

Seeing this brings joy to my inner 14 year old grumpy goth and I'm like, more power to you! Anything that takes the world in the diametric opposite direction from, Olive Garden, Gap and Accord land is totally a good thing. Life among the unthinking is too horrifying to comprehend. So I salute y'all, Furry people! I plan on horrifying my brother someday by becoming a Furry Executive Transvestite. Let's just combine all of the characteristics into one giant, pulsating ball of total FREAKISHNESS. I'll be able to destroy chain restaurants merely by THINKING about them.

Tuesday, October 23, 2007

Civ Pro Outline

http://128.32.29.133/exams/
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/registrar/exams/
http://www.uky.edu/Law/exams/
http://www.wmitchell.edu/library/exam-archive-by-course.asp


[Jurisdiction]
- Definition: the power to declare law
- Courts powers are limited
- Two main types of jurisdiction. BOTH are required for a court to enter a valid judgment
o Personal Jurisdiction: power over the persons in the lawsuit
o Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Power to hear the type of suit brought

[Personal Jurisdiction]
- Three main types of Personal Jurisdiction
o In Personam: service performed on the Δ to resolve a controversy involving personal obligations
o In Rem: Focuses on a dispute over property w/in the Forum
o Quasi in Rem: Service is performed on a piece of property w/in a forum and used to adjudicate a personal obligation (can only get up to value of property)
- Reason that PJ is required
o 5th and 14th Amendments: due process: fairness

[Traditional Forms of Personal Jurisdiction]
- Domicile: Suit in Δ’s home state. Resident of State
o State of incorporation for a corporation & principle place of business
- Waiver
o Party acts in a manner incompatible with assertion that forum lacks jurisdictional basis
- Consent
o Express: Can consent to jurisdiction of a court
o Implied: By doing an action in the state such as driving
- Transient Jurisdiction
o Courts have all power over persons and property w/in its boarders
 Grace v. MacArthur: Δ was served while flying over the state; service was held to be valid

[Ways to fight Jurisdiction]
- Art. IV, Sect. 1 of US Constitution: Full Faith and Credit Clause
o Requires states to up hold judgments from courts in other states
o States do NOT have to up hold judgments if the ruling court did not have jurisdiction
- Direct Attack:
o Enter under a Special Appearance and attack jurisdiction directly
o Problems: have to travel to inconvenient forum and stuck with decision
- Collateral Attack:
o Do nothing and wait to attack jurisdiction when judgment is brought against you

[Ways to fight jurisdiction w/o acting inconsistent w/ PJ argument]
- Special Appearance: CAN ONLY fight jurisdiction
- Limited Appearance: fight the case on the merits against property that has been attached

[Personal Jurisdiction over a Nonresident Defendant]
- Two main areas
o Pennoyer Era
o Post-Pennoyer Era (Minimum Contacts)

[Pennoyer Era]
- Prior to 1877 the constitutional framework for regulating personal jurisdiction was uncertain
- Pennoyer v. Neff:
o Facts: Mitchell sued N for unpaid legal fees. N was not present and did not own property in Oregon. P won default judgment. Later N bought property in Oregon and Mitchell filed against it to secure the amount owned to him. Mitchell won and sold his interest to Pennoyer. N then sued P for ejection. Supreme Court said that Oregon courts did not have the power to hear the original suit b/c N was not present and did not own property at the time.
- Created Bright Line PJ Rule: Due Process requires service within a State’s Boundaries on the defendant or someone authorized to accept service for him. “Every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction over persons and property w/in its territories”
- Notice:
o In Personam: requires personal service
o In Rem: can publish
- Problems with Pennoyer: 70 years of confusion amount courts
o What to do w/ a foreign corporation
 OK for states to req. someone be appointed for service but when is there presence enough to req. this?

[Minimum Contacts/Modern Era]
- Much confusion after Peynnoyer: Courts attempted to determine when a corporation was “present”
- International Shoe v. Washington: court rejected the “presence” analysis and instead introduced a reasonableness standard known as minimum contacts
o Required Δ to have “certain minimum contacts with [the forum], such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”.
 Does the Δ have contacts w/ the forum?
 Are the Contacts minimally sufficient to comport w/ traditional notions for fair play and substantial justice?

[Relatedness of the Claim to the Contact]
- International Shoe did not provide an exhaustive test; but one main idea is that a court looks at the contact with the forum and level of relatedness to the action brought
 McGee v. International Ins.: Single Contact can be enough so long as it is sufficiently related to the claim
• Casual or isolated contact w/o strong connect to claim = no PJ


[Purposeful Availment]
- Hanson v. Denckla: Δ must have “purposefully availed” himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state for PJ to apply. Π Unilateral action is insufficient.
- WWWV v. Woodson: Even though it was foreseeable that product would end up forum it was not sufficient for PJ b/c dealer had not availed itself to the benefits of protections of the forum.
o Foreseeability that a product will be in a forum it not enough. Rather “it is Δ conduct and connection with the forum such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”

[Quasi-In Rem Jurisdiction and Minimum Contacts]
- Shafer v. Heitner: Quasi-in-Rem jurisdiction only valid if it satisfies the minimum contact standard

[Stream of Commerce]
- What happens when a manufacture makes a product which is later sold (not by the manufacturer) in different forum. Confusion exists between two theories (Ashai):
o Pure Stream Theory: Allows for valid jurisdiction whether or not the original maker knows the goods will be sold in a particular state
o Stream Plus Theory: requires clear evidence that the Δ seeks to serve a particular state, such as designing the product for the forum market or advertising there
 Must somehow target the forum:
a) marketing in forum
b) designing product for forum
c) controlling supply system for forum

[General Jurisdiction]
- Δ forum contacts are unrelated to the controversy
- Contact must be “so substantial and continuous” that the Δ would expect to be subject to a suit of any claim in the forum
- Can get PJ over Δ for any claim even those which do not originate in the forum

[Specific Jurisdiction]
- Exists when there is a connection between the forum and the Δ actions that generated the controversy
- Contact must relate to the claim in order to have in personam jurisdiction
- If not General Jurisdiction, must have specific jurisdiction
- Use minimum contact analysis defined in Shoe and following cases
Tutorial Two
10/5/07

[Purposeful Availment]
- Hanson v. Denckla: Δ must have “purposefully availed” himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state for PJ to apply. Π Unilateral action is insufficient.
- WWWV v. Woodson: Even though it was foreseeable that product would end up forum it was not sufficient for PJ b/c dealer had not availed itself to the benefits of protections of the forum.
o Foreseeability that a product will be in a forum it not enough. Rather “it is Δ conduct and connection with the forum such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”

[Stream of Commerce]
- What happens when a manufacture makes a product which is later sold (not by the manufacturer) in different forum. Confusion exists between two theories (Ashai):
o Pure Stream Theory: Allows for valid jurisdiction whether or not the original maker knows the goods will be sold in a particular state. Simply place product into the stream of commerce is sufficient.
o Stream Plus Theory: requires clear evidence that the Δ seeks to serve a particular state, such as designing the product for the forum market or advertising there
 Must somehow target the forum:
a) marketing in forum
b) designing product for forum
c) controlling supply system for forum

[Fairness Factors in Jurisdictional Calculus]
- There are times, even when jurisdiction is presumptively valid that it would not be “fair” for court to exercise PJ over the Δ. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Ct.
o Interest in the Forum state in providing redress for its citizens: forum state’s interest in adjudicating the matter
o Interest of the π is obtaining relief in a convenient forum: plaintiff’s interest in complete relief
o the shared interests of the states in furthering substantive social policy
 Safety on shared roadways, etc.
o Extent of the inconvenience to the Δ is she if forced to defend away from home: burden on the defendant VERY IMPORTANT
o the efficient resolution of the controversy
 Where is the bulk of the evidence
- Typically used when contacts are barely sufficient




[Minimum Contacts and Contracts / Burger King]
- General Proposition: All of Δ contacts related to the controversy need not be with the Forum (After WWVW seemed to think that actions had to be directed to the forum…this said otherwise)
- When is contracting with someone of another state sufficient:
o Business Negotiations (sent payments to FL and Spoke w/ Mimi HQ)
o Contemplated Future Consequences
o Terms of the K
o Actual Business Dealings between the parties
o Level of Sophistication of the parties

[Effects Test]
- Calder v. Jones: Δ profited from the sale of National Inquirer Magazine which defamed Jones. She sued the reporter and editor, FL residents. Court upheld personal jurisdiction b/c the effect of the FL conduct in California. They knew that their FL actions would have a potential devastating effect on Jones in CA.

[Minimum Contacts and the π]
- Hustler v. Keeton: due process does not require minimum contacts between the plaintiff and the forum

[Internet and Personal Jurisdiction]
- No General Jurisdiction: Technically the Internet is everywhere
- Pavlovich v. Superior Court: Website printed how to decrypt a DVD; movie industry sued. No personal jurisdiction b/c Δ did not express a direct intent, that is target, to cause harm in the CA forum (remember the effects test, supra)
- Zippo: If Business “clearly does business over the internet” PJ applies. Looks to the Interactivity of the site:
1) purely interactive sight = jurisdiction
2) somewhat interactive sight = murky
3) purely informational sight = no jurisdiction

[General Jurisdiction]
- Δ forum contacts are unrelated to the controversy
- Contact must be “so substantial and continuous” that the Δ would expect to be subject to a suit of any claim in the forum.
- Can get PJ over Δ for any claim even those which do not originate in the forum

[Specific Jurisdiction]
- Exists when there is a connection between the forum and the Δ actions that generated the controversy
- Contact must relate to the claim in order to have in personam jurisdiction
- If not General Jurisdiction, must have specific jurisdiction
- Use minimum contact analysis defined in Shoe and following cases


[Presence and Minimum Contacts]
- Burnham v. Superior Court: Presence is still valid for jurisdictional purposes
o Based on historical ideas of power and states sovereignty (Scalia)
o Based on Purposeful Availment (Brennan)

[Consent Revisited]
- Historically a Δ could consent to the jurisdiction to the court
o Express
o Implied
- Three main types of Jurisdiction Related Contract Provisions
o Choice of Law: chose which type of law will govern the transaction
 This type of Clause was found in Burger King
o Consent to Jurisdiction: Person waives all objections to PJ in a particular jurisdiction
 Valid after National Equipment Rental
o Forum Selection Clause: Wave objection to jurisdiction and wave right to bring suit anywhere but the said forum
 Valid after: Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute: Court upheld a forum selection clause that was printed on the back of a passengers ticket
- Remember: Courts always look to the enforceability of the K

Tutorial 3

[Presence and Minimum Contacts]
- Burnham v. Superior Court: Presence is still valid for jurisdictional purposes
o Based on historical ideas of power and states sovereignty (Scalia)
o Based on Purposeful Availment (Brennan)

[Consent Revisited]
- Historically a Δ could consent to the jurisdiction to the court
o Express
o Implied
- Three main types of Jurisdiction Related Contract Provisions
o Choice of Law: chose which type of law will govern the transaction
 This type of Clause was found in Burger King
o Consent to Jurisdiction: Person waives all objections to PJ in a particular jurisdiction
 Valid after National Equipment Rental
o Forum Selection Clause: Wave objection to jurisdiction and wave right to bring suit anywhere but the said forum
 Valid after: Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute: Court upheld a forum selection clause that was printed on the back of a passengers ticket
 Remember: Courts always look to the enforceability of the K

[Notice]
- Federal and State Adjudications are binding only when they satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Constitution
o Territorial limitation
o Notice limitation
o Subject Matter limitation
- Notice Requires sufficient Service of Process
o Process: summons directing Δ to respond or appear
o Service: formal means in which Process is delivered

[Modern standard]
- Defined in Mullane v. Central Hanover
o Notice must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objects…”
o Court did not give an exacting standard, but rather authorized service by the best alternative means under the circumstances
 Subsequent cases looked at the knowledge of Δ whereabouts and the methods used notify them (see Greene v. Lindsey where court rejected eviction proceeding where process was nailed to the door b/c process could have been mailed as well)
o Trick: Look to the cost of locating/serving the party and compare it to the interest of the part

[FRCP Rule 4]
- Persons Authorized to Serve Process  Any person who is
o Not a party to the suit AND
o at least 18 years of age
- Ways service can be performed
o delivering the summons and complaint to the individual personally
o leaving the summons and complaint at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein
o delivering the summons and complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process
o Mail  Most common
 Complaint and Summons are mailed to Δ. Accompanying these documents is an “acknowledgment of service” (or waiver of service). Δ then can choose to waive formal service by filling out the form and sending it back to the π.
• Advantage (carrot) for waiving formal service:
o Get 60 days to answer from date you send acknowledgement back (as opposed to 20)
• Punishment (stick) for not waiving formal service
o Δ has to pay the cost associated with formal serivce and any attorny fees associated w/ obatining them
 Δ who waives service does NOT waive objections to venue or jurisdiction

[Personal Jurisdiction and Federal Courts]
- Rule 4 limits Federal Courts power  they typically only have personal jurisdiction over defendants whom the state court has valid personal jurisdiction over. Thus Federal Courts personal jurisdictional powers are limited to the state that they are in.
o Exception: Bulge Rule: when parties are joined under rule 14 or 19 of FRCP, personal jurisdiction is extended to 100 miles of the court-house location.

[Statutory Limits on Personal Jurisdiction – Long Arm Statutes]
- 14th Amendment defines the outer bounds of fundamental limitations on the power of state courts when exercising power over Δ.
- It is up to each state legislature to actual grant power of their courts to exercise personal jurisdiction
- Every Personal Jurisdiction evaluation involves a two step analysis
o FIRST: Does the state’s Long Arm Statute authorize the court to exercise authority over the Δ?
o SECOND: Is it constitutional to do so?
- State Long Arm Statutes generally have taken two forms
o Blanket Approach: conferring all jurisdiction permitted by federal constitutional law
 See California LAS: authorizes courts to exercise jurisdiction “on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of the State or of the United States”
o Enumerated Approach: authorize jurisdiction over defendants based on specific types of contact with the forum state (claim must arise out of this contact)

[Georgia Long Arm Statue]
- 5 “Fingers” of the Georgia Long Arm Statute
o transacting business within the state
o commits a tortious act or omission within this state, except defamation
 Illinois rule: (Grey) tort resulting in damage within the state deemed to have occurred inside the state if warranted by “fair play and substantial justice.”
 New York rule: tort committed within the state only if the act/omission itself occurs within the state, not merely the injury. GA follows this rule.
o commits a tortious injury in the state caused by an act or omission outside this state if the tort-feasor regularly does business … or derives revenue …
o owns/uses/possesses real property within the state
o marriage related cause of action, if matrimonial domicile within state


[Venue]
- Like personal jurisdiction, venue determines where litigation will take place
- Locates litigation within a state or judicial district
- Must plead improper venue at the onset of litigation or the objection is waived
- Parties can select venue by contract

Tutorial 4

[Venue]
- Like personal jurisdiction, venue determines where litigation will take place
- Locates litigation within a state or judicial district
- Must plead improper venue at the onset of litigation or the objection is waived
- Parties can select venue by contract

[Federal Venue Rules]
- 28 U.S.C. § 1391
o (a)1 & (b)1: allows suit to be brought in the judicial district where any Δ resides, so long as all Δ reside in the same State
 Typically is deemed to be where Δ actually lives
o (a)2 & (b)2: allows suit to be brought in the judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred
o If neither one of the above are available; fall back is:
 (a)3: If the SMJ for the case is solely diversity; suit can be brought in a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action was commenced
 (b)3: If the SMJ is not solely diversity: suit can be brought in any judicial district in which any Δ may be found
o (c): Corporate Δ: defines “resides” for a corporate Δ: suit can be brought in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action was commenced. If corporation is in a state w/ multiple districts, corporation is deemed to reside in any district sufficient to establish PJ as if that district were its own state.
- Note that Venue can be waived.
- 28 U.S.C. § 1392
o Any local action involving property located in different districts can be brought in any of those districts.

[Forum Non Conveniens]
- Even if present forum is technically appropriate, courts have the power to dismiss based on the inconvenience that a particular forum poses
- Courts do not have the power to transfer outside of their judicial system and instead, use this doctrine as an end-run around this restriction.
- Used for inter-system transfers (state to federal; federal to foreign; etc.)
- Two Requirements
o (1): An adequate alternative forum is available
 less favorable application of the law is not enough to show inadequacy Piper
o (2) Δ must show that considerations of party and forum convenience override the π choice of forum and justify dismissal
 Private Interest Factors
• a) Ease of access to sources of proof
• b) Availability of unwilling witnesses attendance
• c) Possibility of view of premises
• d) Other practical problems (speed, expense)
 Public Interest Factors
• a) Court congestion
• b) Local interest in local controversies
• c) Desire to have forum coincide w/ law
• d) Burden to citizens in unrelated forum w/ jury duty
- Court has power to condition dismissal upon some sort of action by Δ
o Agreement to waiver SOL issues
o Submit to jurisdiction of alternative forum

[Transfer]
- Allows a case to be transferred w/in a judicial system to a forum where the case might have been brought
- Case picks up where it left off, thus no need to re-file, etc.
- 28 U.S.C. §1404: Allows for transfer for the connivance of the parties and witness as well as if it is “in the interest of justice”
o Tip: uses common law Forum Non Conveniens factors BUT in a much relaxed manner
- 28 U.S.C. §1406: Even if venue is improper a court can transfer the case to a forum w/ proper venue (can also dismiss)

[Subject Matter Jurisdiction]
- The power of the court to hear the subject matter presented in a particular case
- Need SMJ for each claim brought before the court
- States can allocate subject matter jurisdiction however they want – constitutions, statutes, etc.
- Art. III § 2 of the Constitution sets out the permissible scope of the judicial power of the federal courts.
- Federal courts have been granted exclusive jurisdiction over certain cases
o Admiralty
o Bankruptcy
o Antitrust
- State courts have been granted exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters as well
o State tax collection
- Many cases however fall within shared or concurrent jurisdiction between the federal and state courts
o Diversity 28 U.S.C. §1332
o Federal Question 28 U.S.C. §1331
- SMJ argument can be raised at any time prior to a final judgment being entered

[Federal Question 28 U.S.C. § 1331]
- Constitution allows for federal SMJ when a case “arises under the Constitution, statutes, or treaties of the federal government.”
- When interpreting Art. III § 2, when looking at the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for instance, “arising under” has been interpreted to create valid SMJ where a questions arising under federal law was an ‘ingredient’ to the suit whether or not it was actually raised by the parties, so long as it is potentially applicable to the action.
- § 1331, which grants power to the Federal Courts, mirrors the language of Art. III exactly, but has been interpreted much more narrowly than under the Constitution.
- Well Pleaded Complaint Rule (Mottley): §1331 does not confer jurisdiction on the federal district courts over cases involving federal law unless the federal issue is necessary to the proof of the plaintiff’s claim.
o Trick: Ask whether the π would have to raise the federal issue in a complaint which includes the elements she needs to prove to establish her claim…NOT defenses to the complaint

[Diversity 28 U.S.C. §1332]
- Art. III § 2 grants power to hear cases ‘between citizens of different states’
- Policy is to avoid “home cookin’”
- Supreme Court has interpreted to Art. III § 2 to require “minimum diversity”, that is there is at least one Δ that is diverse from at least one π.
- While interpreting § 1332, which grants federal courts power to hear cases, the Court has required “complete (Strawbridge) diversity” which requires all Δ to be diverse from all π.
- Excluded from Diversity actions
o Ankenbrandt: domestic relation cases can not use Diversity SMJ in federal courts
o Deny where jurisdiction has been “improperly or collusively” made.
 Assignment of right to create jurisdiction is improper
• Administrators are deemed to be from the citizenship of the person they represent (child, deceased, ect.)

[Citizenship Requirement]
- Look to the citizenship of the parties at the time the action was commenced (filed)
o Post-commencement changes neither create nor destroy jurisdiction
- Citizenship for diversity purposes has been equated to domicile
- Individuals
o Each person has only one domicile
o Domicile requires (1) physical presence & (2) intent to remain there
o Once a domicile is established, you maintain that domicile until you have another one
o Subjective analysis is required
 (Look for these while arguing): place of employment, voter registration, driver’s licenses, current residence, bank accounts, etc
- Corporation
o Are Domiciled (1) in the place where they are incorporated and (2) where they have their principle place of business
 Nerve Theory: place where the executive and administrative functions are controlled
 Muscle Theory: place where most of the everyday activities of the corporation occur

[Amount in Controversy]
- Currently requires an amount greater than $75,000 in controversy
- Good Faith amount as determined at the beginning of the action (well pleaded complaint)
- Aggregating amounts of several claims:
o Π may aggregate all the claims he asserts against a single Δ, whether or not the claims are related.
o If two π each have claims against a single Δ they may not aggregate if their claims are “separate and distinct”
 If interest of group of π or Δ are NOT separate and distinct (ie undivided common interest) look to the amount of the undivided interest
o If π have a claim against multiple Δ, the amount must be sufficient as per each Δ
- Counter Claims
o If π claim meets the amount in controversy requirement, compulsory counterclaims can be heard regardless of the amount, while permissive counter claims require an independent jurisdictional basis.

[Supplemental Jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. §1367]
- Used to allow federal courts to have SMJ when some claims in a controversy satisfy independent SMJ basis and some do not
- §1367 codified a very confusing common law allowance of these types of actions
- §1367(a): extends federal jurisdiction from freestanding claims within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts to supplemental claims that are “so related that they form part of the same case or controversy…”
o Look for a common Nucleus of Operative Facts (CNOF) (Gibbs test)
- § 1367(b): In diversity-only cases, courts do not have supplemental jurisdiction over claims by π against persons added as parties (Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24).
o Still a lot of confusion among the courts as to how to properly apply this rule. Basic idea is that the Court was not going to allow a π to create an end-run around the complete diversity requirement.
o Policy: π chooses the forum
- §1367 (c): Even if court can exercise Supplemental jurisdiction, they are not required to so. Must look at discretionary factors:
o claim raises novel or complex state law issue
o state claim predominates federal claim
o all federal claims dismissed
o other compelling reasons (efficiency, common sense)

[Removal 28 U.S.C. §1441]
- Congress has granted power to defendants to second guess the π forum selection
- Only available to Δ…π can not remove even if counter claimed
- All Δ must join in the removal action
- Available in civil actions where the district court has original jurisdiction over the action
o Court asks if the district court could have had jurisdiction had the action originally been filed in federal court
o Can only be removed to the federal court sitting in the place where such action is pending (§1441(a))
- §1441(b): Δ can not remove action if original federal SMJ would have been diversity and the action was brought in a state court in which any defendant is a citizen.
o Policy: Home cookin’ is no longer a fear
- §1446: Δ must file a removal action w/in 30 days of receiving the pleading or other paper affording him grounds for removal
o Action is filed in the district court in which the state court where the action is currently pending lies.
o §1446 (b): prevents removal after 1yr. of the commencement of an action where the original federal SMJ would have been diversity
- §1441 (c): If a π files an action in state court with an independently removable federal question claim together with “separate and distinct” state actions this code section allows a federal judge to either (1) retain the whole removed case OR (2) remand all matters in which the State law predominates.
o With the passage of Supplemental jurisdiction this point is largely mooted b/c if both claims arise from CONF, court has independent basis to hear the claim
Tutorial 5

[Removal 28 U.S.C. §1441]
- Congress has granted power to defendants to second guess the π forum selection
- Only available to Δ…π can not remove even if counter claimed
- All Δ must join in the removal action
- Available in civil actions where the district court has original jurisdiction over the action
o Court asks if the district court could have had jurisdiction had the action originally been filed in federal court
o Can only be removed to the federal court sitting in the place where such action is pending (§1441(a))
- §1441(b): Δ can not remove action if original federal SMJ would have been diversity and the action was brought in a state court in which any defendant is a citizen.
o Policy: Home cookin’ is no longer a fear
- §1446: Δ must file a removal action w/in 30 days of receiving the pleading or other paper affording him grounds for removal
o Action is filed in the district court in which the state court where the action is currently pending lies.
o §1446 (b): prevents removal after 1yr. of the commencement of an action where the original federal SMJ would have been diversity
- §1441 (c): If a π files an action in state court with an independently removable federal question claim together with “separate and distinct” state actions this code section allows a federal judge to either (1) retain the whole removed case OR (2) remand all matters in which the State law predominates.
o With the passage of Supplemental jurisdiction this point is largely mooted b/c if both claims arise from CONF, court has independent basis to hear the claim

[Two systems, Two Laws  Whose law applies?]
- Having two overlapping judicial systems creates difficulty when deciding whose law to apply to a claim.
- When dealing with Federal Question SMJ, the federal law is always applied
o Reason: Constitution has granted Congress the power to makes these laws
- Problems arise when dealing with state based claims (Diversity and Supplemental SMJ)
o Reason: Congress does not have the authority to create many types of laws (contracts, tort, etc.  Constitution has granted those powers to the States)

[Swift v. Tyson]
- Court had to interpret the Rules and Decision Act which said when dealing with Non-Federal Question SMJ, “The rules of the several states shall apply”
- Court interpreted that phrase as only referring to statutes and certain established local usages of the state…NOT to judicial decisions interpreting general principles of the common law
- Thus, in (1) non federal question cases and (2) when deciding a common law issue, federal judges should examine all common law authorities to ascertain the proper rule.
- Swift Rationale (natural law view):
o Idea that judges are not charged with making the law, but rather, they merely find or declare that law
- Swift Problems:
o Created forum manipulation
o Unfairness to non-diverse parties (if you were diverse you had two choices of law (state common law by filing in state court – or federal common law if you filed in federal court) whereas non-diverse parties had only one (state court common law)
- BASIC Swift effect: created two bodies of common law: State and Federal
o Note: Federal judges did not have to follow the federal common law (natural law theory)

[The Erie Decision]
- Court overruled the Swift idea of a federal common law for 3 main reasons
o Failed its mission to create a general common law
o Non-Diverse party discrimination
o Swift doctrine was unconstitutional: allowed federal judiciary to make laws which they had no delegated powers to do
- Basic Erie Rule: In diversity cases federal courts must apply the law that would be applied by the courts of the state in which they sit (this is the easy rule to 97% of all cases)
- Problems with Erie
o In what seemed like an afterthought in the Erie decision, the court stated that “of course the federal courts can apply their own purely procedural rules”

[Substantive / Procedural distinction]
- Substantive law: definition of state-created rights and obligations by the state courts  If Substantive law: apply state rule
- Procedural is defined as: form of mode and enforcement  if Procedural…it depends
- Dunlap: State law applies if it applies to a “substantial right” of the parties
o Thus, courts not only apply state law on “substantive rules”, but also on matters of procedure that that relate the enforcement of state rights.
- Guaranty Trust: Introduced an outcome determinative test: State law applies if the state procedure “significantly affected the result of the litigation”
o This created obvious problems  almost everything would affect the outcome.
 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
 Service requirements
 Placement of a staple, etc.
- Bryd v. Blue Ridge: Court must not only decided whether the procedural rule is outcome determinative but should also consider any countervailing federal policies that arise from the federal court’s status as an independent judicial system
o Thus, even though a rule would affect the outcome of the litigation, the federal procedural rule can apply if there is a strong federal policy to apply the federal rule
 Example: a constitutional amendment

[Hanna v. Plumer]
- Facts: π served process on the Δ by leaving the summons and the complaint at the home with an eligible person (FRCP 4) but Massachusetts statutes required personal delivery to the Δ. Court said federal procedural rule could apply for two reasons:
- Hanna Part 1: Modified outcome determinative test  Whether a federal procedure “significantly affects the outcome of litigation” must be viewed in the policies underlying Erie
o (1) to prevent forum shopping
o (2) to prevent inequitable administration of the law
 HERE: very doubtful that a π would chose of forum b/c they could leave the summons at the abode of the Δ as opposed to person service.
- RULE of Hanna Part 1: Applies state procedure only where the disputed rule would either govern the forum the π would choose OR cause an inequitable administration of the law
- Hanna Part 2: Different Analysis when an official Federal Rule of Civil Procedure conflicts with a state law
o Both statutory and constitutional authority for FRCP
 Necessary and Proper clause provides constitutional authority
 Rule of Decisions Act provides statutory authority
o RULE of Hanna Part 2: Congress and the Courts have broad constitutional authority to promulgate any Federal Rule that is “arguably procedural”
 VERY hard to argue that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is not “arguably procedural” b/c it was passed by they were recommended by the Advisory Committee, promulgated by the Supreme Court, and endorsed by Congress.


Hawkins v. Masters Farms
Diversity jurisdiction; if parties are diverse, can go to Fed. Ct and not state.
When are they diverse? We have to look at where they are domiciled = physical presence in a place + state of mind concerning one's intent to remain there.

Bridges v. Diesel Service
Bridges sued Diesel Service for dismissal under ADA, Defendant moved to sanction pl. b/c should have exhausted EEOC remedies first. Court says: sanctions are for frivolous/unmeritorious filing, and this is not it. (Rule 11)

Bell v. Nowick Transfer
Pl. injured in car accident caused by truck operated by def. Defs move to dismiss b/c of insufficient complaint. Ct. found that did not need very detailed complaint to continue, needed for State ct, but not Fed, so defs. shot themselves in the foot by moving to fed. ct.
PER: 28 U.S.C. 1441, any civil action brought in a state court can be removed by def. to district court. , 1446 gives procedure for removal. (Rule 12 B 6): failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

JURISDICTION: Personal: does this court have power over this person? Subject matter: does the court have power over this problem: probate/bankruptcy ct.

12 B(1) Motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

12 B (2) lack of personal jurisdiction

12 B (3) improper venue

12 B (4) insufficiency of process

12 B 5 insufficiency of service of process

12 B 7 Failure to join a party under Rule 19

JOINDER: putting all parties which should be involved together at once; must be transactionally related.

Bridgeport Music v. 11C music
770 music/entertainment co's sued because of sampling/copyright infringement
Each song is a separate occurrence so no joinder. Joining all these cases would create unreasonable prejudice and expense to defendants, also impossible to try case.

DISCOVERY:

Butler v. Rigby
Health care providers did not want discovery; overruled, we have very liberal discovery rules

Houchens v. American Home Ins.

Pl sued Def for breach of K, b/c husband disappeared, and def refused to pay on accidental death policy. No evidence to show accidental death, so summary judgment (No reasonable person could find for other side/no reason to go to trial)

Norton v. Snapper Power Equipment
Norton injured when riding lawnmower fell on him. Jury in Dist. Ct found for plaintiff, then Dist Ct issued a Judgment Non Obstante Verdicto, then reversed by appellate ct.

Res Judicata: this question has been answered by the courts, so can't do it again

Claim preclusion: Can't sue for the same claim twice. (Arm and leg: same claim)

Rush v. City of Maple Heights
Rush injured in motorbike accident sued city twice, once for damage to bike and then once again for personal injury. Previously, two separate claims, this court does away with that for efficiency's sake. Court mentions Vasu: in that case, can sue ins. co and tortfeasor separately.

Apex Hosiery v. Leader
Leader does not want discovery; can't appeal orders/motions until final verdict.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION: Pennoyer v. Neff: neff hired Mitchell to represent him; Neff iddn't pay, Mitchell sued him in State ct. and won- he wasn't served with process, Mitchell got default judgment. Neff later buys property w/in state. Mitchell uses default judgment to get property + sells to pennoyer.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION:
28 u.s.c $ 1331 grants federal courts jurisdiction over questions that arise under federal law. Admiralty= fed only, family matters= state only. Defenses arising from Constitution do not place case in Fed ct.
Louisville and Nashville RR v. Mottley. Mottleys sued in Fed ct after granted lifetime pass which was then taken away. Ct sez: they're not diverse; and the cause of action isn't constitutionally based.
Well Pleaded Complaint Rule: if the federal complaint, as filed by Pl, does not contain a federal question, it can't proceed in fed. ct. Since Mottleys suing for breach of K, thrown out.

REMOVAL:

28 $ 1441 a) if it's brought in a state ct and dist cts have original jurisdiction, can be removed by def. there.
b) If fed question, can be removed w/o considering diversity.

Caterpillar v. Lewis.
Originally there was diversity based federal jurisdiction, then parties which made it diverse dropped out,
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

The ERIE question: state or fed law with overlapping jurisdiction?
A Fed ct having diversity jurisdiction must apply the law, common/statutory of the state IN WHICH THEY SIT in resolving the dispute.
Tompkins' arm cut off by Erie rr, while he was visiting PA. We dunno where he's from. Dunno where RR is from. Since he doesn't want to be considered a trespasser under PA law, he brings suit in Fed ct. Judgment for Pl, rr appeals all the way to Sup Ct and offers to settle.
Case of Brown & Yellow v. Black and White brought up. RR wanted former to have sole custom, but that would be void under common law of KY so Brown & Yellow reincorporated in TN, filed suit in Fed Ct under diversity jurisdiction and won, b/c they can do it under fed law but not KY state law. This sux, sez ct. "The law to be applied in any case is the law of the state, common or statutory, except if Constitutional or by Acts of Congress. See also: 28 $ 1652, the laws of the several states, except etc., will be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the US cts.

Ct did not overrule Swift b/c it was wrongly decided, can't do that, has to be unconstitutional.
Erie requires deference to state courts and lawmaking bodies and federal cts are an independent judicial system. feds have power over procedure.
Guaranty Trust v. York. (U.S. Sup Ct '45)
Pls sued bond trustee for breach of trust in Fed diversity ct. under NY law. Under NY stat of limitations, claim barred, under fed, not so.
Statute of limitations, is it a matter of procedure?
Well, we want to make sure result is the same as it would be in state ct., so out goes suit.

Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative
Pl injured while on construction job for def, not directly employed by def, but doing same work, and so claimed recompense under South Carolina Workmen's comp act which sez; judge decides whether injured party has valid claim. Decided not to follow state rule and give jury the decision as is the rule in Fed ct. (what to do when fed practice not dictated by particular rule/statute)
Hanna v. Plumer
service of process under state (personal service reqd) or federal (can leave w/competent adult) guidelines (ct decided fed law rules!) (what to do when a rule or fed statute governs federal practice)
Hanna: Erie questions arise when a fed ct would behave differently than a state ct. If practice dictated by FRCP, if statute/rule is constitutional, ct must follow, even if significantly different from state practice.)
Hanna's principle will yield a result different from Guaranty Trust whenever the federal practice is dictated by a federal statute or Rule (as long as statute or rule is constitutional and within scope of Rules Enabling Act)
Byrd deals with when federal practice comes from common law of federal procedure or custom.
Byrd has 3 questions
Is state practice "bound up with the definition of the rights and obligations of the parties?" if yes, state law governs
Would its application determine the outcome of the case?
If so, are there "affirmative countervailing" considerations fo federal judicial administration present?

Flow chart:
If there is no conflict, apply state law (+ fed)
Is there a valid Federal Positive (law that is issued, (rule or statute) not common law)? if yes, apply Fed Law.
Is Fed Common law outcome determinative-
If no, apply fed law, if yes, balance state and fed interest
examine 1: twin arms of Erie, avoiding forum shopping and equality of outcome
2: State Sovereignty under Semtek; ct in Hanna ignored state sovereignty, Scalia reintroduces
Ragan asked: when does suit commence? Fed rule is on filing, State rule is on service, the Sup Ct found outcome determinative conflict so applied state rule.

Hanna said that Ragan said there was no conflict (they can say whatever they want.)
Cohen-shareholders must post bond if suing corporation, the federal rule says they don't have to, the state rule says yes they do, ct decides there is no conflict between the rules and applies the state rule. In these cases, ct favoured federal rules
Pre Byrd + Hanna, ct favoured state law, did not want to find conflicts; post byrd and Hanna, ct favoured federal rules and wanted to find conflicts, at Gasparini pendulum swings back. .
Burlington Northern marks a shift- if def appeals money judgment and loses, Pl gets add'l 10% under AL law. Under fed law, if it's a frivolous appeal, they can award single or double costs. In this case ct chose to interpret these laws as in conflict and used Federal law.
Stewart v. Ricoh, AL refused to enforce forum selection clause, ct decided it conflicted w/ 28 USC 1404, transfer statute. why transfer? convenience in the interests of justice, if there is a conflict, apply Fed law.
Gasparini: pendulum swings back. NY law, appellate cts can reduce excessive jury awards, vs 7th amendment to constitution, can't reexamine outside that of the common law. Both state and fed interests are significant here, we can't have state appellate review a fed decision so ct writes new rule accommodating state sovereignty.

Semtek: Brings suit against Lockheed-martin in CA, dismissed, brings suit in MD, Lockheed sez, no you don't either, this has been decided. No, sez Sup ct. this may have been decided in CA but hasn't been decided in other states. Fed law sez if it's been dismissed on the merits it's claim preclusive according to Fed Rule 42, but this rule is rubbish 'cos violates rules enabling act, it would violate/abridge a substantive right.

How do you tell if it's substantive or procedural? If you would change the court depending on that thing, then it's substantive- paper size or the like is not substantive. Statute of limitations can be either. Ct decides this is based on common law, Erie told us no such thing as general fed common law, we'll apply state rule from state where fed ct is sitting. Fed system should be able to vindicate its important interests, like throw out cases permanently if counsel lies or something. Here no fed interest or conflict. Fed rule is apply state law- claim preclusive in CA but has nothing to do with other states. Sovereignty v. Fed power. Arms of Erie, like Equality, we want results to be the same whether suit is brought in state or Fed Ct.

Thursday, October 18, 2007

Torts Outline


Tort: Civil wrong for which the law provides a remedy; to provide a peaceful means for adjusting the rights of wrong parties. Burden of proof merely requires preponderance of proof

Spano v. Perini: Strict liability OK, doesn't stop valuable economic activity in blasting. Suit is about allocating costs. Liability separated from fault at least in this case.

Garrett v. Dailey: minor status does not absolve liability in battery. There has to be:

INTENT: ACTOR KNEW TO A SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINTY THAT harmful/offensive CONTACT/APPREHENSION SHOULD/WILL HAPPEN. PURPOSE to cause harm. (or, what a reasonable person MUST have known to a substantial certainty, etc) NOT intent to act. NEVER say Def. acted intentionally. Cannot be negated by mistake.

Intentional torts: Battery, Assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land, trespass to chattels. Intentional torts= punitive damages + actual damages
Negligence= only actual damages.

Contrast w/ negligence; what a reasonable person SHOULD have known would cause harmful/offensive contact.
BATTERY: INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF A HARMFUL/OFFENSIVE CONTACT WITH THE PERSON OF THE PLAINTIFF

Spivey v. Battaglia, hug resulted in partial paralysis.
Not battery: def. cannot know that these bizarre injuries would to a substantial certainty result. ; or, b/c she was shy, likely to know to be harmful/offensive.

Battery= intent + harmful/offensive contact. Two standards for harmful/offensive; what the actor found harmful/offensive, what a reasonable person would have found harmful/offensive.

Wallace v. Rosen, teacher "pushed parent down stairs"
Accidental/unavoidable touching ? no battery.

Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel
Does not have to be body, can be something attached to body to constitute battery. (plate)

There must be a contact for there to be a battery;
if Bartender puts alcohol in patron's drink who requests a nonalcoholic drink, that's a battery, (argue both ways) Doesn't have to directly touch pl.
Not needed: knowledge of harm likely to result; if battery is found, then you are responsible for ALL damages resulting from.

ASSAULT: Def; acts with an intent to place the victim in an apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive contact or to make such a contact. Future threats don't count.

attempt to commit a battery; must have created apprehension of imminent battery in reasonable person (has to be possible)
Western Union Telegraph v. Hill, (lustful midget)

False Imprisonment:
Big Town Nursing Home v. Newman;
pl. asked to leave, was refused to do so, kept for 51 days against his will, If the means of escape is not reasonably safe/appropriate, that's false imprisonment. (direct restraint of one person of physical liberty of another w/o adequate legal justification.) Must be aware they are falsely imprisoned: no liability unless the person restrained knows of it or is harmed by it.

Parvi v. City of Kingston

Pl was trying to calm some drunks, picked up by officers, he told them he had no place to go, they let him out on a golf course. Just 'cos you don't REMEMBER doesn't mean you weren't AWARE of it at the time.


continuum of awareness of risk:

Negligence lowest: a REASONABLE person would find it reasonably foreseeable that bad thing likely to result;

Recklessness: highly likely to cause a contact; aware of a significant risk

Knowledge to a substantial certainty most aware of risk, required for intent.

In Battery, intent is transferable; if I intend to shoot Hillary and instead shoot Mitt Romney, I am still liable for Battery. (Talmadge v. Smith) Also works for other crimes; if you intend to commit battery and wind up w/assault.

Ransom v. Kittner

Tresspass to chattels; shot the wrong animal, does not absolve you of liability

McGuire v. Almy (Mr. Rochester's wife)
Mentally ill liable for battery. Can entertain intent.

False Imprisonment:

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Trespass to Land:

Privileges (defenses):

Consent; implied/express

Self Defense/Defense of others

Defense of Property

Recovery of Property

necessity

Authority of Law

Discipline

Justification

NEGLIGENCE: table with four legs: duty, breach, damage, causal connection btw. conduct/injury. In most cases, element of duty is satisfied.

Elements of Cause of Action

A Negligence Formula

The Standard of Care

The Reasonable Prudent Person

The Professional

Aggravated negligence

Rules of Law

Violation of Statute (Negligence Per Se)

Res Ipsa Loquitur: We don't know what the hell happened. Elements: The thing that caused the accident/damage was under the exclusive control of def; accident would not ordinarily happen w/o negligence on the part of the def.

Ybarra v. Spangard (unconscious patient is one of the exceptions discussed to can't sue > 1 def)

Ybarra sued Spangard for improper treatment: he developed paralysis in arm as result of an operation. We don't know who in the operating room was exactly responsible and obviously no one will own up to it. Normally cannot bring Res Ipsa Loquitur against a bunch of people, but, partially b/c patient was unconscious, we see no other way, except for strict liability and we DON'T want that. All defs. equally liable for caring for pl.

Sullivan v. Crabtree

Pls. sued for death of son Sullivan, killed when guest in truck which overturned down embankment. Suit against owner dismissed, against driver continues on appeal. Falls under Res Ipsa Loquitur b/c we don't know exactly what caused driver to lose control of truck. Were these circumstances under driver's control? Was there negligence? usually in these cases, yes. For Res Ipsa Loquitur, we need: a warranted inference of negligence: could not have occurred w/o def's negligence; A presumption of negligence- def has burden of refuting. It's for the jury to decide that, it could be or not, and they decided it wasn't and ruled for def.

CAUSATION IN FACT:

Sine qua non

Perkins v. Texas & New Orleans ry. co.

Pl's car hit by train, husband+ another killed, widow sued.

Pl + def rr concede that car driver was negligent. Train also traveling 12 miles over speed limit. Was this a cause of collision? Ok- is it a substantial factor in bringing about that harm? In this case, it was a substantial factor (but for) . If no (but for) not a substantial factor. Even at 25, couldn't have stopped train. So Pls say; If the train had been slower, the car coulda sped up and avoided; ct sez; that's not good enough, there's not enough evidence.

Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. It is negligence when the fat lady falls.

Pl & wife sued after she fell down stairs, she was fat and told to hurry up. & she fell. Def sez; she coulda fallen anyway! But ct sez; possibility that it might have happened w/o def's negligence is not enough to break the causal connection. Accident did occur b/c of def's negligence, so fat lady gets $. We dunno what woulda/coulda/shoulda happened.

Tests of causation: "But for" test; injury would not have occurred 'but for" def's negligence

Alternative test: Substantial factor: negligence was a "substantial factor" in bringing about the harm, common for loss of chance cases.

Herskovits v. Group Health, Pl suffered from undiagnosed lung cancer, caused 14 percent reduction in chances of survival, he wouldn't have survived anyway. Loss of chance test. pl can sue.

Scientific Evidence problems: admissibility, does it reflect "scientific knowledge: not necessarily a consensus. Is testimony relevant?

Daubert v. merrill dow, Pl alleged that mother's ingestion of Benedectin caused birth defects. Old evidence test: do most scientists agree, new evidence test, is it scientifically "valid". Pl's scientists have not previously done work in this field, and don't prove that Benedectin causes birth defects.

Hill v. Edmonds; multiple insufficient causes/Concurrent causes
ct dismissed action against owner of tractor who left it parked w/o lights in the middle of the road. Pl was passenger in car which collided w/tractor, ct found driver guilty of negligence- she coulda caused accident. This Ct sez; well, even if she were negligent, but for truck being in the middle of the road, wouldna happened. When separate acts of negligence combine to produce directly a single injury, each tortfeasor is responsible for the entire result, even though his act alone might not have caused it. So remanded and reinstated complaint against truck owner.

Anderson v. Minneapolis ---RR. co.

Fire started in Bog, caused by negligence of def. Merged with another, separate fire, both of which burned over pl's property.
This ct uses Cook rule: One who negligently sets a fire is not liable if another's property is damaged, unless it is made to appear that the fire was a material force in the destruction of the property.
If the fire combines with another of no responsible origin, and after the union of the two fires, they destroy the property, and either fire independently of the other would have destroyed it, then the first person is still liable.

Problems in determining which party caused the harm

Summers v. Tice

Tice and Simonson negligently shot pl. while hunting. Defs say, we're not joint and severally liable! Not acting in concert! We couldna both shot him!
Precedent sez; Well, only one of you coulda dun it, and we dunno who, so you're both in trouble. Y'all figure out which one of you is at fault.

Sindell v. Abbott Labs.
Pl was injured as a result of drug administered to mother during pregnancy. We dunno manufacturer, but can we hold copycat manufacturer liable?
If pls can establish by a preponderance of proof that (item) manufactured by one of the defs, then burden of proof as to causation shifts to all defs. Here we gots too many folks, Also no evidence that defs jointly controlled the risk.

PROXIMATE/LEGAL CAUSE

Cause in fact = "but for"- once you have established cause in fact, then can establish legal liability= proximate cause.

ANY CAUSE WHICH IN THE NATURAL AND CONTINUOUS SEQUENCE, UNBROKEN BY AN EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE, PRODUCES THE RESULT COMPLAINED OF AND WITHOUT WHICH THE RESULT WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED.

Unforeseeable EXTENT of harm: still liable: eggshell pl; def liable for all injuries resulting from a physical injury whether they were foreseeable or not (man goes mad after car accident)

Unforeseeable TYPE of harm: still liable

Unforeseeable MANNER of harm: still liable (rat doused with petrol explodes)

Unforeseeable PLAINTIFF: still liable

Unforeseeable consequences

Ryan v. NYC rr.

Sparks from engine set woodshed afire, 130 feet from house, burned pl's house & several others. Judgment for def, affirmed. We have to limit this at some point; pl can claim for ppty on which sparks directly fell, but can't be found negligent for next house and so forth. We have Cause in Fact but not Proximate Cause.

Bartolone v. Jeckovich

Pl had car accident, defs liable, minor injuries resulted in complete psychotic break. Jury returned verdict for pl, ct gave jnov. This ct overturns citing precedent; you can go crazy from car accident, or car accident can aggravate your underlying insanity. Cause in fact = proximate cause.

Rule: Def must take pl as he finds him.

Polemis v. Furness, Withy & co., Furness W chartered vessel to polemis, plank fell into hold, igniting petrol vapours, ship blew up, owners sued polemis for value of ship. Ct decided: there was negligence, just 'cos not foreseeable, does not mean lack of negligence. (Unforeseen type of harm; no one expected the dropping of plank to create spark to explode ship but it did)

Overseas Tankship v. Morts Dock & Engineering, Wagon Mound 1) not liable

Overseas Tankship v. Miller Tankship (Wagon Mound 2) Accident foreseeable, they coulda stopped the oil from leaking out and that was a bad thing. So reversal for ship's owners

Palsgraf v. LI rr co. Pl hit by scales after def pushed passenger onto train, dislodging package which promptly exploded. Ct decided there's no negligence related to pl, negligence maybe towards package carrier,

Yun v. Ford Motor Co, etc. Tire fell off conversion van, dad gets out to retrieve, is squashed flat. Yun sues everyone in the entire world, apparently, including: !Precious! the driver, Ford, Miller, the manufacturer of the tire assembly, Universal, converter, Castle, the dealer, and Kim's mobile service center, which told her tire might fall out. Pls must prove that alleged defect in spare tire caused injuries sustained by Chang. Was Chang's conduct reasonably foreseeable? NO, you cross parkway, you smash flat. Ct sez; his highly extraordinary and dangerous actions in crossing parkway constitute a superseding and intervening cause of his own injuries

Intervening Causes:

Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Co.

Def Felix digging up street, pl was sealing a gas main, Dickens came along and had a seizure and hit pl who landed in boiling enamel who then ignited into a fire ball. Pl alleged that def was negligent in insuring safety. Def sez; this is freakish accident, Dickens' fault, When the acts of a third person intervene between the defs conduct and the pls injury, the causal connection is not automatically severed. Liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by def's negligence. Here an obvious possible result of def's negligence is that a driver will come in and injure a worker, and driver's negligence/recklessness does not insulate def from liability. Foreseeable, normal, and natural result of the risk created by Felix was the injury of a worker by a car entering the improperly protected work area. Def liable.

Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge &rr co

Tank car full of petrol derailed, valve broken, petrol ran all over the place. Duerr either set it on fire by dropping match accidentally, or by doing it deliberately. We dunno. If it was accidental, they're liable, if it was malicious, no. Explosion likely to result from spilt petrol, but can't foresee or deem it probable that malicious actor will blow it up. Criminal conduct frequently breaks liability chain.

Fuller v. Preis Pl got jury verdict for 200K, Appellate div. set aside, dismissing complaint, appeals. Dr. Lewis committed suicide 7 months after car accident which left him epileptic. Is suicide an "irresistible impulse" caused by traumatic organic brain damage? we dunno, but it could be, and that's what the jury said.

McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Co

McCoy rescuer after Suzuki swerved off road and rolled. McCoy hit while walking on side of road, sued: driver for negligent driving, passenger for negligently grabbing wheel, State for negligence of trooper, Suzuki for defective car. Suzuki said: rescue doctrine doesn't apply to product liability, and McCoy must and cannot prove Suzuki proximately caused his injuries. TC said rescue doctrine does apply to product liability BUT Suxuki not proximate cause of MCCoy's injuries. Appeals ct said, injured rescuer need not prove def proximately caused the injuries, only that def proximately caused the danger.

Rescue doctrine: injured rescuer can sue party which caused the danger requiring the rescue in the first place.

Factors: (1) def negligent to person rescued and this negligence caused the peril or appearance of peril to the person rescued (2) the peril or appearance of peril was imminent (3) a reasonably prudent person would have concluded such peril or appearance of peril existed (4) the rescuer acted with reasonable car in effectuating the rescue.

Suxuki sez: we have a product liability statute, go away with your rescue doctrine. Ct sez, no.

Ct sez; rescue doctrine means pl must show def's negligence proximately caused injuries- is that so? let the jury decide.

Public Policy

Kelly V. Gwinnell

Tuesday, October 16, 2007

Ask Cruella Dearest!

O Cruella Dearest;

My house is infested with wiggers! What can I do?

Wigger infestations have grown increasingly common in America's moderately affluent suburbs. People with houses larger than 4 bedrooms, constructed out of brick, in two parent households in which at least one parent makes above the median income are especially prone to wigger infestations. Truly rich people and only moderately middle class people are fairly immune, but less affluent people can also be afflicted. But it's not your fault, and there's a solution. The first thing to know is that if you see one wigger, that means you have a whole bunch more where you can't see them. To tackle your problem, get rid of anything that attracts wiggers; a family of wiggers can live off of just one 3 second Tupac sample for up to a month. So you have to get rid of:

All basketball related items
Any oversize article of clothing
Any sneakers that are moderately expensive. Wear penny loafers.
Any records that could even possibly be considered to have any black involvement. You have to play Kenny G, Judy Garland, and Barry Manilow. Nonstop. Yes, your cat may become gay or something, but- you can't cross the river without bouncing a few cookies.
Cook strange things out of Bon Appetit, the weird things that real human beings won't eat unless they live in dire poverty, like yucca. Wiggers subsist on wings, ribs, pizza, and drive-thrus, with occasional trips to The Olive Garden or Red Lobster.

Now once you have eliminated anything that could attract them, you have to stamp out the infestation.
Attract emo children; the emo is the natural enemy of the wigger. Play Death Cab for Cutie, or opera, which is like blues/country for people who can only enjoy very high pitched sounds, and wear really tight clothing and floppy hair and mascara, and try to dress like Marilyn Manson would if he had some imagination and wasn't a poseur.
Read Sylvia Plath, aloud, and write poetry about how you wear black/because it's how you feel inside/and when I go to my room/I just want to hide.

Hint: if your house is infested with emos, then you can just do the opposite. Buy several '80's Cutlasses, put Dubs on them, and paint them colours that would be considered garish for whore nail varnish and park them in the yard, wear long white t-shirts with visors, etc.

What is law school like?


Scientists claim that the brain has no nerve endings itself, and therefore cannot feel pain.

These scientists have never been to law school. My actual brain does indeed hurt; and this is not like a headache, this is actual brain ache, all over, and it feels the way people tell me your muscles feel after working out (like I would know). Also it is a whole world of frustration, especially RWA, which asks you basically to dream the impossible dream. If it's impossible, how can you dream it? People fond of zen puzzles will enjoy this. If you can imagine the sound of one hand clapping, there you go.

O Cruella Dearest,


Why are you not a doctor?

First of all, I have a hard time with people sometimes, particularly if they are sick and whiny, and I do not want to get near their smelly orifices and stick my hands into their icky insides.

I would totally be like Dr. Kevorkian, except worse, and for everything I would recommend euthanasia. Instead of asking about your family history and what medications you are on, i would ask things like:

Do you walk around with their bluetooth headset shouting inanities into apparent thin air like you are some kind of schizoid Lt. Uhura?

Do you subscribe to People magazine?

Have you ever read people magazine, and not just 'cause you were really desperate for reading material, because the only other thing to read was Actuarial Tables, 1979 edition, and you had read that TWICE?

Do you collect plates (and here I mean not like, Depression Glass or plates that belonged to Napoleon III, those are fine) I mean, plates with horses on them or Red Indians or Thomas Kinkaid paintings. Ok? Not even if the plates have pictures of my car on them. Well, maybe.

Can you use Art, and Thomas Kinkaid, ever in the same sentence?

Do you wear sweat pants without shame?

Have you ever entertained the idea of buying a Honda Sedan and spending a whole bunch of money to make it look stupid?

Do you shop in overpriced "boutiques" and pay 5 times as much for the same thing bought at Pier 1?

Do you have an interest in anything ending in -ball and actually care about this, like you never bothered to find out what your brother does for a living really or whether or not he likes it but you know all the statistics for some player?

Do you have plastic floral arrangements in your house?

Do you have carpet on your toilet?

Do you give people really awful gifts, the kind that no one in their right minds wants?

Do you use the words "separation anxiety" and "my cats" in the same sentence?

Do you generally have the opinion that if you were to stop existing, the world would be suddenly thrown into crisis?


Are you Donald Trump?

Do you believe what the newspaper/television news media tells you?


Do any of your joints hurt?

Not even a little bit?


Not even a little tiny bit?


Do you own a top 40 anything compilation?


Have you ever served your family a meal that required the assistance of an animated spokescharacter?

Do you eat Ez- cheez?

Have you ever consumed anything described as "lite"

Do you think pink is an acceptable colour for wine?

Have you conflated the lives of celebrities with your own life? (If you don't know what conflated means, put Yes.)

Have you ever taken anyone to Red Lobster or Olive Garden for any reason other than immediate death?

If they answered yes to even one question, then I would ease them gently into that good night. I mean, really.


Thursday, October 11, 2007

Contracts Notes

Contract:
agreement with certain obligations for which some sort of legal enforcement is available if performance is not forthcoming as promised. Can be oral or written agreement between 2 or more persons
Something has to be EXCHANGED- each party has to provide something
a promise is involved
Enforceable

Mutual Assent: Simply agreement by both parties, v. Meeting of the Minds- where both parties had the same things in mind.

Meeting of the minds: Deep understanding of all the terms involved, the actual intention rather than the conduct determines each party's legal obligations.

K not enforceable if: to do sthing illegal, made under duress, or by a minor. (Ks made by minor become enforceable at 18; also enforceable for necessities)

Promises must involve consideration to be enforceable; cannot enforce a promise to make a gift.

Most courts prefer to use mutual assent rather than meeting of minds, b/c it's easier to determine when/how K made.

Intention to be Bound: the Objective Theory of Contract
Ray v. Eurice;
Long complex back and forth contract negotiations; Eurice refused to honour K, Ray sues for breach of K, ct sez; doesn't matter what Eurices THOUGHT they were agreeing to, shoulda read it. Intent doesn't matter.

Offer and Acceptance in Bilateral K: Bilateral: Both parties exchange promises of performance to take place in the future- both parties are both promisors and promisees.
Offer: willingness to enter into K, uses fixed pupose language, requiring no further expression of assent. Offer results in: A) acceptance B) rejection C) if terms are changed, counteroffer D) lapse/revocation

Mailbox rule: acceptance effective as soon as it is dispatched by offeree. Medium of acceptance must be reasonable in circumstances.
Offer/revocation has to be communicated to be effective, but offeror has power over offer to revoke at any time prior to performance.
Offer creates power of acceptance, terminated by: offeree's rejection, revocation by offeror, or death or incapacity.

Lonergan v. Scolnick

Pl alleges that def Scolnick entered into a K agreeing to sell 40 acre tract of land. Def placed ad in paper, lower ct. decided no K. Just an offer. Letters were offer rather than K. Def sold to another person. Ads are invitations to offer, pl made offer, not specific enough to be offer.

Izadi v. Machado Gus Ford Inc.
Pl wanted to buy ford per ad. Was ad a binding offer? Yes, per statute. ct did not like superfine print in ad. Based on what a reasonable person would think, yes, can buy car for that price. If K contradicts itself, then we have to reconcile contradictory terms. Fits into objective theory, would a reasonable person think. Generally advertisements are invitations for offer, not offers.

Normile v. Miller
def miller offered house for sale. Pls Normile completed offer and signed 4 Aug to be completed and signed 5 aug, agent came back with changes to def (which constituted counteroffer) 4 aug. Returned to Pl 4 Aug, did not immediately accept terms. Agent goes to another buyer with similar counteroffer, accepted by def. Pl accepts and returns counteroffer by original deadline
Offeror (def) can change mind and revoke offer at any time. Effective as soon as offeror tells offeree.

Dispatch rule: when did it leave your control (also mailbox rule) then Offer is valid, even if offeror never receives. Telephone messages can be considered deposited acceptance, depending on state.
If you make offer to sell, and several people accept, you have to give other parties notice of revocation. Once you deposit your acceptance, you can't change your mind. Rejection/revocation is effective on receipt so if you call and change your mind, too bad, you've accepted.

Offer and Acceptance in Unilateral K: If offeror offers to exchange promise of future performance for promisee's ACTUAL rendering of performance , unilateral K. Only the promisor is offeror, offeree's rendering of performance is actual acceptance.

Patterson v. Pettberg
Pl was executrix for Patterson, owner of real estate, def held bond executed by pl, (like Mortgage) Def wrote pl, agreed to accept cash for mortgage. BUT def sold mortgage prior to deadline set by def, pl had agreed to sell land, making it necessary to pay off mortgage in full.
Ct sez; unilateral K proposed, gift of promise of reduction of debt in exchange for actual performance of payment in full. But until promisor actually receives payment, can revoke at any time (this was the one where creditor slammed the door in payer's face) Def gave notice to Pl by telling him he had sold the mortgage and therefore offer was withdrawn. So no K made.

Cook v. Coldwell Banker/Frank Lauben Realty
Pl was agent working for Def. Def promised bonus, pl worked very hard to earn bonus, left before bonus awarded. Rule: offeror cannot revoke offer the offeree has accepted by substantial performance- that's the consideration.

True Unilateral Ks

agreement + consideration, meeting of the minds doesn't matter.
Revocation is effective when offeree receives it, can just be reliable information provided by a third party does not have to be direct communication by offeror. Offer has to stay open for a reasonable amount of time, see $36 restatement. Even if K sez offer can't be revoked, it can too.

Other Methods of Reaching Mutual Assent Introduces UCC Article 2-102 transactions in goods.
Harlow & Jones v. Advance Steel
Harlow agreed to sell advance steel 1000 tons steel for shipment Sept-Oct 1974 per phone conversations. Def rejected partially, alleged it didn't come in on time. Was confirmation form sent by Pl an offer accepted by def in mailing back purchase order form? Terms are identical in major particulars. Ct sez; y'all had an oral K as is custom, confirmed by written forms. UCC 2-207 deals with Battle of the Forms

What is Consideration?

Hamer v. Sidway
Uncle promised nevvy $$ if nevvy gave up legal rights to smoking and drinking (bilateral K) Def alleged no consideration, ct sez; that's what uncle wanted and bargained for, was of a detriment to nevvy/asset to uncle, so it's consideration- consideration does not have to be limited to $ or things of tangible value or exchangeable.

Covenant: for breach of K under deed, very formal and official

Action of Debt: formal/informal, must be for specific $

Assumpsit for Breach of Promise (Hairy Hand)

Pennsy Supply v. American Ash Recycling
Pennsy used American Ash's AggRite to pave parking lot, which later collapsed. AggRite is haz. waste, Pennsy must pay $$$ to remove, ask AggRite, which refused. Even though K did not mention Pennsy's removal/disposal of AggRite as consideration, it still is b/c Agg Rite got consideration by not having to remove/dispose of it themselves. This not having to remove/dispose of it was part of the 'Quid pro Quo" of agreement. Also Implied Warranty claims: AggRite gave away this stuff as being suitable for Pennsy's purposes which it turned out not to be.

Bargain theory: I'll do something for you if you do something for me, doesn't have to be express, no negotiation required.
Condition for a gift not consideration, example of if you walk round to store, they will give you overcoat- normal process of acceptance, giftee doesn't give up anything to accept gift.

Applying the Consideration Doctrine

Dougherty v. Salt
Aunt promised boy $3000, ct decided, not a K, no consideration from boy, unenforceable promise of executory gift. Past consideration (because you've done qqch in the past, I'll give you something in the future, is not consideration) Aunt coulda gotten round this by Will, Trust, or Gift Now.

Batsakis v. Demotsis
Pl sued def to recover $2k lent during war. def returned to Pl $25, value now of money lent then. Ct decided, you promised to pay $2000, even if you only received $25, that's what you promised and bargained for. Does not have to be "fair" or "equivalent value" Can't pick and choose terms in K to enforce, either the whole thing's good, or the whole thing's crap. Nominal consideration (I'll sell Mitch Caravan for $1) not true consideration, b/c not bargained for and I don't care if I get $1 or not. Deal not enforceable.

Illusory promise- performance optional with the promisor- makes it difficult to enforce, output K, I'll buy however many you make, is difficult, also requirement K, I'll buy every widget I need from you, difficult. Most common application is at will, promisor reserves the right to terminate w/o notice to promisee.

Plowman v. Indian Refining Co.
Pl sez; they made a K to pay pensions and they didn't. Def sez, no consideration. Ct sez. Sadly, moral obligation is not consideration. Also Agency problem, the person making the K didn't have the authority to make it. Actual authority is communication from principal to agent, apparent Authority is from principal to 3rd party.

Issues in Applying the Concept of Mutual Assent
Limiting the offeror's power to Revoke, the Effect of Pre-Acceptance Reliance

Offer is revocable unless and until accepted by offeree, even if offer states it can't be revoked. Offeree only accepts through full performance. If offeree gives offeror $ to hold offer open, it's an option K and irrevocable.

Promissory Estoppel: perhaps I didn't have a K but I believe in a promise and rely on it in some way to my detriment, I have to do/not do qqch. If injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise, we have promissory estoppel and promise is binding. Damages more limited than in K.
Four elements: There must be a promise
Promisor expects reliance, or should reasonably have expected reliance
Promisee does rely within reason on promise
Detriment


Executory promise: one that runs into the future.
James Baird v. Gimbel bros.
Gimbel makes offer to put linoleum in PA hwy dept for Baird, then discovers error on sheet sent to a bunch of contractors. Tries to revoke but Baird has accepted. Baird relied on Gimbel so that's promissory estoppel. BUT ct sez; well, Baird's not BOUND to use Gimbel, so why should Gimbel be bound to Baird? If pl had repudiated K to build after it had been awarded, def could not sue. There wasn't acceptance, so not really applicable here.


Drennan v. Star Paving
Drennan submitted bid to build school, star paving submitted bid via form, def immediately said wanted twice as much, Pl had to find someone else. Def's bid induced action on part of promisee, so we have promissory estoppel. Def argued honest mistake, ct did not buy, actual harm here shown. (this is more current, cts more likely nowadays to find promissory estoppel)
Star has an obligation to make Drennan whole, so promissory estoppel found.

Berryman v. Kmoch
Kmoch wanted to buy land from Berryman, came up w/option K, but never activated option or provided consideration for option. Kmoch alleges, other valuable consideration for time & expenses to survey it or something. Ct sez, to hell with you and your other valuable consideration, it is NOT.

Pop's Cones v. Resorts International Hotel
Resorts promised Pop's Cones they could move in, then lent premises to another, Pop's Cones sues and wins. They lost the business from '94-'96, can get that. Much more difficult to prove what they would have gained from moving into promised spot (expectation damages)- some cts allow, some don't. Previous cts required "clear and definite promise" this ct abolishes that. Expression of intent does not equal promise. Cts also look at sophistication of the parties involved.

Irrevocability by Statute: The "Firm Offer"

Qualified Acceptance: The "battle of Forms"

Is it a UCC (goods) K?
Are the terms add'l- one party has added qqch or are they different- one party sez red other party sez blue?

What are the documents? Offer, counteroffer, acceptance, confirmation? Are both of the parties merchants? Is something expressly conditional? Is there a material alteration?
How do you tell if it's an offer or acceptance? an offer is typically on the buyer's form, an acceptance is typically on the seller's form.

If: additional terms in acceptance- if merchants, go through 2-207-2, if not, add'l terms drop out.

Add'l terms in confirmation? If merchants, go through 2-207-2, if not, add'l terms drop out

Add'l terms in offer? Offeror wins (last shot) Acceptance acts as acceptance of all terms unless the offeree expressly objects

Different terms in confirmations, different terms drop out under Comment 6 "knockout rule"

Different terms in acceptance, cts/jurisdictions differ. Some think both terms drop out unter comment 6, some think offeror wins under 2-207-1b/c comment 6 is for confirmations, not acceptances, Or both may drop out under 2-207-2c and comment 3

If the terms are so different that 2nd form is not an acceptance but a counteroffer, no K. If the parties perform, 2-207-3 determines the terms. The UCC provisions on Usage of trade, course of dealing, etc, are applicable.

Expressly conditional offer- 2-207-2-a
Offer sez; my terms 1, 2, and 3 and no others
Acceptance adds term 4

There are two possibilities, K is formed but additional term drops out under 2-207-2-a and C, or, No K if first form precludes acceptance w/ suggested add'l terms. Can't have an expressly conditional confirmation- an oral K has already been formed, and it can't be unilaterally modified

Expressly conditional counteroffer - 2-207-1
Offer, my terms 1, 2, and 3
Acceptance all of the above and expressly conditional on term 4 as well.

No K unless offeror expressly consents. Conduct may form a K but is generally not sufficient to imply acceptance of the add'l terms. If there is performance use 2-207-3
Princess Cruises v. General Electric
K btw. Princess Cruises and GE for repair (not goods= not UCC) of a ship. Pl made purchase order to have ship serviced as an offer, can be accepted through acknowledgment or performance, GE to provide warranty. GE returned erroneous/incomplete price quotation, then revised (now a counteroffer), rejected terms and conditions in Princess' PO. Princess accepted by telephone, now it's a K. Problems after GE does maintenance, Princess sues GE for $$$ including time ship was out of commission. This is admiralty law about services and falls out of UCC. Ct sez: Princess accepted GE's counteroffer including terms limiting liability so damages are limited. An acceptance that varies the terms of an offer is a counteroffer which rejects the original offer. Manifestation can be express or implied by non-action, here Princess did not act in response.

Last shot rule, person (typically seller) who sends last shot-last form- dictates terms of accepted K under common law. (old, superseded by UCC as applicable)

Mirror Image Rule: if it sez it's an acceptance but contains changes, it's a counter offer. (old, superseded by UCC as applicable)

If you write back and accept, you accept original terms even if you make changes, unless acceptance is conditioned on those different terms

Brown Machine v. Hercules, Inc
Brown sold Hercules a machine for making Cool Whip bowls, part of k sez; buyer will pay on behalf of Brown all injury claims arising from machine (indemnification clause)
Hercules returns P.O. with their own terms, seller accepts these terms by 2nd machine order, therefore leaving out the indemnification clause. Brown's original submission was a price quotation and an offer to enter into negotiations. Per Brown's language, Brown has to receive offer and accept. Brown's original offer wasn't accepted in timely manner, either. Hercules' P.O. is offer and accepted by Brown.

UCC 2-207: rejects strict "mirror image" rule, a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance is an acceptance even though it states terms add'l to or different from those offered.
2-207 (2) Add'l terms will be added to K btw merchants
Unless offer expressly limits acceptance to offer terms
Unless it's materially altered- and nearly everything materially alters it- look at comments 4 and 5 under 2-207 to see.
Cts can look at usage of trade, does this cause "surprise and hardship"
Notification of objection has been given or is given w/in a reasonable time after notice is received
Conduct is sufficient to establish K.

Offeree's response to an offer constitutes valid acceptance even if different terms.
Postponed Bargaining, the Agreement to Agree

Sometimes parties agree on certain key terms and leave some out to agree on them later or there may be an unresolved conflict btw. terms.
Walker v. Keith
Walkers leased land to Keiths for 10 years at 100/mo. Option to renew, parties could not agree on rent, lower ct decided on amount, this ct sez, too vague, there's no way to determine the rent, An agreement to agree is not a binding K. They didn't agree on essential term, so no K.

Quake Construction Inc v. American Airlines, Inc.
American hired another contractor who in turn hired Quake, Jones sent quake a letter confirming a K was to be sent with specifics, included price and some details
Was letter of intent an enforceable K? Depends on parties' intent. b/c work was to start shortly after letter, they intended to be bound. There was a cancellation clause. We need to remand to find what parties intended exactly.
Agreement to agree, we've decided on ABC now we consider how to get to DEF.
Formal contract- contemplated execution of formal written K.

Electronic Contracting
Shrinkwrap terms: purchaser orders product, wrapped in contract terms, use of product constitutes your agreement with those terms. If you don't accept must return product within X days.

Clickwrap terms: before completing purchase, purchaser must scroll through terms of sale and click I agree.

Browsewrap terms: available on site but you don't have to click to agree; you agree merely by browsing the site.

Brower v. Gateway 2000 Inc.
Sued Gateway after Gateway did not provide guaranteed support. There was an arbitration clause in the agreement, Inconvenient and impossible to do. Ct sez; arbitration clause not material alteration of K, just one part. K acceptance happened when customers kept it beyond 30 days. Doesn't count as adhesion K because consumer could buy alternate product. But because arbitration may not be feasible/sensible, we will decide to take it to U.S.

In cases like this purchaser does not make offer, vendor does by shipping product. (not always the rule; sometimes buyer is offeror depending on jurisd) see UCC 2-314
Unconscionable- could be procedurally- buried in fine print, hidden from notice or unavoidable
or substantively- unreasonably favours one party- going to Chicago not enough, but excessive costs are.

Register. com Inc v. Verio
Register issues domain names to people through ICANN agreement, Verio accessed Register's public domain info for marketing purposes. Icann sez; we should handle this internally, Verio sez; Register can't prevent us from accessing this public info, that's a breach of K with Icann. Register had browsewrap K that you wouldn't reuse this information for sales/mkting. Verio received K terms after accessing data and sez, we shouldn't be bound, but ct sez, you did it too many times and too frequently. It is not necessary to click I agree to agree.


Other theories of restitution: Promissory Estoppel and restitution

Promissory Estoppel: perhaps I didn't have a K but I believe in a promise and rely on it in some way to my detriment, I have to do/not do qqch. If injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise, we have promissory estoppel and promise is binding. Damages more limited than in K.
Four elements: There must be a promise
Promisor expects reliance, or should reasonably have expected reliance
Promisee does rely within reason on promise
Detriment

Promises within the Family

Kirksey v. Kirksey
Pl def's sister in law. Def invited Pl to live w/him after brother dies. She left her land and moved to house of def, who put her up and then wanted her to move away and then leave. Verdict from lower ct for pl. Inconvenience pl endured not considered to be consideration.

Greiner v. Greiner
Pl (at behest of evil son) seeks to reclaim land from one son. Frank moves from wherever he is back to Mom's land at her behest, she moves house onto land, her statement of intention that I'm going to give you the house can be considered K b/c there was consideration in Frank's moving. and Frank had possession.

Wright v. Newman
Newman sued for child support against Wright, who was not the father of her children, but promised to pay, so this somehow stopped Newman from seeking the actual father of her children- court invokes Promissory estoppel. & makes him pay

Charitable Subscriptions

King v. Trustees of Boston University
King wants papers back after Dr had made a charitable pledge of these papers to University. Charitable pledge is not a K. there's no exchange or consideration. A bailment was established with King as bailor and BU as bailee. Promises of gifts, again, not enforceable

Promises in a Commercial Context

Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc.
Pl wanted pention payments from Danny Dare. B/c of injury he was strongly suggested to retire. there was a promise of a pension, was there detrimental reliance? He gave up his earnings. Injustice can only be avoided by enforcement- yes, so if you've relied on the promise, they must pay.

Shoemaker v. Commonwealth Bank
Mortgagor, obligated by a mortgage to obtain insurance can establish a cause of action in promissory estoppel, yes.

Third theory: Restitution: Liability for Benefits Received; unjust enrichment

Restitution in the Absence of a Promise: not a K at all but legally enforceable obligation. Like if Fulton County gives me extra 0 in check, it's not a K, not promissory estoppel, (there's no promise) but I'm obligated to repay.

Credit Bureau Enterprises, Inc. v. Pelo
Pelo all crazy, gets committed, sez I won't pay 'cos I didn't agree to it. Ct decided he received property or benefits w/o making compensation, so he must pay.


$116
a person who has supplied things or services to another, although acting w/o the other's knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefore from the other if
(a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefore
(b) the things or services were necessary to prevent the other from suffering serious bodily harm or pain
(c) the person supplying them had no reason to know that the other would not consent to receiving them, if mentally competent
(d) it was impossible for the other to give consent or, because of extreme youth or mental impairment, the other's consent would have been immaterial.

Commerce Partnership 8098 Limited Partnership v. Equity Contracting co.
Commerce owned office building, hired contractor World who hired Equity, Equity didn't get paid by World so sued Commerce- alleging unjust enrichment. commerce had paid World. If Commerce had indeed paid world, Commerce hasn't been unjustly enriched.
Quasi K- Pl conferred benefit on def.
Def has knowledge of benefit
Def has accepted or retained the benefit conferred
it would be inequitable for def to retain the benefit w/o paying fair value.
VERSUS
Contract implied in fact, a person performs services at another ' request, or w/o request but w/knowledge and under presumption that person understood they had to pay.

Promise + consideration+breach=damages=claim for promised benefit/damages
Promise, implied/express + reasonable reliance+ detriment= damages more limited than in K
Restitution Pl conferred benefit on def+ def aware of benefit+ def accepted
Damages based on fair value.
Watts v. Watts
Pl and def cohabited for many years, she wants equitable division of property after separation. There's an express/implied K to share property. unjust enrichment works
Note: family member rendering services for aged, infirm, incapacitated family member all gratuitous. but cts can find exceptions

Promissory Restitution

Mills v. Wyman
Pl cared for def's son, def wrote letter promising to pay. verbal promises cannot be enforced, no consideration.

Webb v. McGowin
Webb drops 75 lb block of wood from upper story, about to drop it on McGowin, webb fell w/block, crippled for life. McGowin agrees to pay Webb $15 biweekly for remainder of Webb's life, does until death. Ct decides this is valid and enforceable K because there was consideration- McGowin's life saved, Webb's detriment injured for life

Material Benefit Rule: if a person receives a material benefit from another, other than gratuitously, a subsequent promise to compensate the person for rendering such benefit is enforceable.
Past consideration doesn't make a K.

Principles of Interpretation and the Parol Evidence Rule

Implied Terms, the Obligation of Good Faith, and Warranties

promise + consideration + failure to comply = not enforceable



Promise + no consideration + compliance = not enforceable.

Statute of Frauds Restatement 110, 137, 133
Promise + no consideration+ compliance= not enforceable
Promise+ consideration+ noncompliance= unenforceable.
Some Ks have to be written down to be enforceable.
UCC 2-201, over $5K,
Contracts for the sale of land or for an interest in land
Contracts that can't be performed within a year, either performance is longer than a year, or- I reserve cabin for Feb 2009, won't happen within a year. If it's POSSIBLE to perform within a year, statute doesn't apply.

Writing must identify the parties and nature of the exchange and must set out all or at least most of the material terms.

2-201-2,
writing can be enforced against non signing party if-
Both parties are merchants
Within a reasonable time of the oral K, one of the parties sends a written confirmation to the other, signed by the sender, satisfies statute against sender
recipient has a reason to know of the contents
And fails to object within 10 days of receipt.
Also Suretyship- that cosigning thing
Executor's agreement to answer for the duty of a decedent
Contract made on consideration of marriage

Does K fall under statute? If no, oral K is enforceable, if yes, is K reflected in a writing that satisfies the statute? If so, then K is enforceable, if not, then does the case fall within one fo the exceptions to the statute that permit enforcement despite non-compliance? (performance or reliance by the plaintiff) if so, K is enforceable, if not, K is unenforceable.
Only party against whom enforcement is sought need have signed it.

UCC provision 2-201 provides that contracts in excess of $5000 be evidenced in writing.
Statute of Frauds requires K be in writing. Remember memoranda etc. can work.
Also does not apply to prior condition on which K performance is contingent- basically, I can introduce evidence that I told Dave, yes, I'll buy house and sign K if I sell my house.

Crabtree v. Elizabeth Arden. offered K w/detailed terms, accepted, they didn't fulfill K. EA sez; can't enforce K 'cos it wasn't in writing. Nuh-uh sez ct, and puts together memoranda to show there was writing to confirm K.

Winternitz v. Summit Hills Joint Venture
sued for breaching K, def said, no K according to statute of frauds- jury gave
Winternitz owned pharmacy, sold to Suhs, Summit Hills refused to honour lease to Suhs. Def sez, you didn't have a K 'cos of statute of frauds, Pl sez, no we partially performed. K exists but is unenforceable- LL didn't sign, so not under statute of frauds. Pl only gets judgment for ll's malicious interference with contract.

If you say you'll put it in writing, but never actually do, that's fraud.
A written denial of contract, if sufficiently detailed, can constitute K.
Is K within statute?
Is there a sufficient writing w/signature (any authenticating mark, can include stationery)
Is there an exception to the statute which will permit enforcement anyway?

Alaska Democratic Party v. Rice
Rice offered oral 2 year K to be Alaska Democratic Party Executive Director. Because she relied on this, promissory estoppel is invoked within Statute of Frauds.

The Sale of Goods Statute of Frauds

Buffaloe v. Hart
Pl rented from defendants orally 5 roanoke barns, then he wanted to buy them, and then resell them. Is check for partial payment sufficient under statute of frauds? Does it 1) contain a writing sufficient to indicate a contract of sale between the parties 2) is signed by the party or his authorised agent against whom enforcement is sought 3) states a quantity. No, Defendants didn't endorse the check. BUT there was partial performance- by buyer, as evidenced by check, so excepted under Statute of frauds.

Principles of Interpretation

Joyner v. Adams
Must finish all development by Sept 1980 or be subject to a retroactive rent increase. sept '80 everything was done except for one parcel, issue here is what "developed" means. Joyner sez; w/buildings, Adams sez; ready for development. See list of terms 358-359 for use on exam.
vague and ambiguous terms in K generally construed against drafter.

If parties attached different meanings to K terms, innocent party prevails.

Ex: I win Lottery, I decide to buy GNX, go in see GNX, when it comes in, it's a GN. Dealer can add the price difference, but I probably asked for the GNX and meant it, 2-313. and should get it. If sample model shown is intended to be representative of eventual purchase, that's what you have to get.

If I call the consignment shop to buy "peter the Kitty" for $250 and go in and then it's a different painting, then there's no agreement so no K.

Frigaliment Importing Co. v. BNS International Sales Co.
What is Chicken? One of them wanted Brathuhn and got Suppenhuhn. K just said chicken. There is a gap in parties' understanding, meaning that pl has to prove that their interpretation is correct. Expert witnesses to establish usage of trade, they say, chicken = chicken and we generally specify what we want.
Objective approach: what the reasonable person would conclude based on reading K.
We look at who drafted the K, and generally resolve terms against drafter. Or, if one party has reason to know or knows what the other party means by certain language and the other party does NOT know or have reason to know of the meaning attached to the disputed language by the first party, the court will enforce the K in accordance with the innocent party's meaning.

1-205, 2-208 course of performance, can establish pattern away from terms and change K. Course of performance is single K with repeated opportunities for performance,
Course of dealings is series of Ks between parties
Usage of trade, how does this industry do things.

2-208 What happens if express terms in K are not in agreement w/usage of trade? K prevails.
Handwritten terms overrule express terms overrule preprinted terms overrule course of performance overrule course of dealing overrule usage of trade.

Consider: language of K, Preliminary negotiations, usage of trade, regulations

C & J Fertilizer v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.
C & J burglarised, allied said, to pay requires visible marks. (to prevent an inside job)
Ct sez; reasonable expectations lead insured to believe this is covered.
Adhesion K.


The parol Evidence Rule; Restatement 209-218, UCC 2-202

Is document intended to be final expression of parties agreement, or is it only partially integrated?
Only applies to written agreements.

Parol Evidence: If it contradicts written K, add'l evidence not admissible. Four corners approach v. Corbin approach (let judge decide based on evidence presented by both sides what K means, what parties meant, and what K sez to see if its ambiguous- let judge hear whatever evidence necessary to interpret or determine whether K is fully integrated). If it's integrated, it's final and complete, if it's partially integrated, add'l evidence can supplement terms but not contradict. Know exceptions 390-391
Does not apply to evidence explaining meaning of agreement. Does not apply to agreements made after the execution of the writing.
Does not apply to evidence offered to show that effectiveness was subject to an oral condition precedent.
Does not apply if evidence shows that K is not a K b/c of fraud, duress, undue influence- fraud is narrowly interpreted.
fraud in inducement- if I tell you qqch contradicted by written agreement, like you get GNX instead of GN- not always admissible
Doesn't apply to evidence offered to establish an equitable remedy such as reformation of the K- suppose we are negotiating back and fortha nd accidentally a paragraph is left out, that evidence can be admitted.
Does not apply to evidence introduced to establish a collateral agreement btw. the parties.
Reliance is not a good exception to Parol Evidence, it's unreasonable to rely on promise contradicted by writing.


Thompson v. Libby
Libby buys logs per written agreement, later claims they are not high enough quality per oral agreement outside of written K, ct sez, can't bring that stuff in, this is complete on its face. Parol evidence doesn't exclude evidence of matters collateral to the subject of written agreement, so this could be collateral, but normally a warranty of quality isn't collateral.

Parol evidence doesn't apply to: If evidence shows that the K is not valid because of fraud, duress, undue influence, incapacity, mistake, or illegality. - mistake, if both I and Ron think it's a turbo 6 but it's an 8. Fraud does not include fraud in inducement, as in, we'll write agreement for term x but orally agree to y. (like we'll write this for tax purposes but orally agree to another price)

Doesn't apply to agreements, oral or written, made AFTER the execution of the writing.

Doesn't apply to evidence offered to show that effectiveness of the agreement was subject to an oral condition precedent- (Dave I'll buy the Biltmore if I can sell my house first)

Parol Evidence rule does not apply to evidence offered to establish an equitable remedy such as reformation of the K.
If we're negotiating back and forth and the secretary accidentally leaves out an important paragraph, we can admit into evidence

Does not apply to evidence introduced to establish a "collateral" agreement btw. the parties (an agreement alongside 1st agreement)

Reliance is Not a good exception to Parol Evidence. It's unreasonable to rely on promise contradicted by writing.

Taylor v. State Farm Ins. Bad Faith claim.
Taylor signed a release agreeing to $15K of uninsured motorist coverage, after car accident he owed $2.5 mil. Ct decided that language of release was ambiguous and used Corbin approach. We can interpret it but not contradict it.
Ct decided: Release language IS subject to differing interpretations.
Extrinsic Evidence DOES support Taylor's claim/interpretation.

Was release a K? Yes, there are promises as well as consideration. Release is valid, but doesn't work against bad faith failure to pay. Release Might be a final, fully integrated K.

Is evidence related to matters that occured at or before K's signing?

Does K contain merger clause?

Does K appear to be complete on its face? (If 4 corners jurisdiction, add'l evidence thrown out)
Does the evidence contradict the writing?

Does it supplement the writing?

Does evidence explain or help interpret the writing, is K ambiguous on its face?

Does your evidence suggest that the writing accidentally failed to state your deal?

Does evidence show that K only effective subject to a condition precedent?

Does evidence indicate that written doc is invalid for some reason?

Does evidence indicate that after K executed there were some changes negotiated?

Sherrod v. Morrison Knudsen: Sherrod claims that Morrison Knudsen hired them to move whatever earth was needed to be moved, much more than K'd for, they promised to work qqch out, and didn't parol evidence rule disallows all evidence of fraud, etc. b/c directly contradicts terms of K.

Nanakuli Paving & Rock v. Shell Oil Co.

Nanakuli filed breach of K against Shell for raising price of asphalt. nanakuli points to other suppliers protecting price, that's custom. Jury ruled for Nanakuli, then judgment n.o.v. for shell, now overturned (for Nanakuli).

Nanakuli argues for custom, so it was assumed to be in there; contract is for market price as written. Previously, Shell had protected Nantakuli from price increases.
2nd theory: Shell obligated to price protect Nantakuli 'cos how business is done - makes it a good faith requirement.

Shell sez: can't bring in suppliers of materials other than asphalt for evidence of custom.
Other instances were waivers of terms of K.
Actual written terms in K control, not these other things.
Ct sez: shell acted out of step with trade usage and commercially reasonable practices and previous agreement/treatment of Nantakuli.
We need to look at :breadth of trade, was it the hawaiian paving trade or just purchase/sale of asphalt.
Were price protections waivers or course of performance of K?
3rd thing:
4th did good faith oblige Shell to at least give advance notice of price increase?

UCC in Hawaii sez usages of trade extend to how it's done in Oahu, not just for asphalt suppliers.

Sherrod v. Morrison Knudsen
Parol Evidence rule disallows this case; Sherrod claims fraud cos MK wanted it to move "all dirt needed" for price X, estimated at Y, turned out to be three times as much, so then MK said, we'll work it out and they didn't so Sherrod took them to ct. There's a merger clause in K. Can't talk about fraud b/c doesn't directly relate to terms of K.
Supplementing the K: Implied Terms, the Obligation of Good Faith, and Warranties
Implied in fact: not stated but implied by the parties themselves.
Implied in law: agreed to through rules of law although not in agreement. Can come from: statute, common law, or ct decision.

Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon
Lady Duff-gordon's special term motion for s. J granted. Wood appealed.
She is fashion designer, he contracted w/her exclusively to produce/market her fashions as well as place her endorsement on the designs of others. Implicit term is that of his exclusive use of her approval, but she broadcast her favours rather widely - - - def sez; not a K; he doesn't bind himself to anything. But this promise to act on her behalf and market her designs, etc. implied. If he doesn't do the work, she don't get no $. etc.

Leibel v. Raynor Manufacturing Co.

Appellee (Raynor) agreed to sell appellant exclusive dealer-distributorship for its garage doors, hardware, etc. at this price. Mutually exclusive. Raynor cancelled after a couple of years and switched distributorships to Helton Overhead Garage doors, and now appellant would have to buy from them. Appellee sez; we can terminate it at any time; appellant sez; we need reasonable notice. Lower ct decided UCC did not apply in this case + "reasonable" notice not required. This ct sez; nuh uh, we need reasonable notice + the case they used was Buttorff! They shoulda Buttorffed! (b/c that was actually a salesman for cameras etc.) Sales from Manuf. to retailer are sales of goods and fall under UCC. Even w/o formal written agreements, we need a requirement for good faith and fair play to avoid this terminating at will. Ct cites several cases of reasonable notice.

UCC 2-306- qqch about output.

UCC 2-309 Time for shipment if not agreed upon may be a reasonable time, K is for reasonable time, can be terminated at any time, reasonable notification has to be provided for unilateral termination.

Problem 5-2 P435
City condemned parking garage, to pay owner $2.5 mil. Owner had leased ppty to parking garage operator/owner/builder, owner sez; you get zippo. Lease sez; any reference to termination of lease includes by expiration, default, or otherwise,
There was a list of latin terms showing that if you have a list of items, they are interpreted in a similar manner, so otherwise may not apply here. Did the parties include condemnation in their agreement. Parol evidence rule could make it inadmissable.
Interpretation: must show ambiguity. In Corbin J, can present evidence to judge. In Willistonian (4 corners J) judge looks at K on face. If it appears complete on its face, to heck with you and your evidence.
Was it an adhesion K? Did the owner have the oppty to impose terms- look at other leases. Who has more bargaining power?
Could we bring in Promissory Estoppel? 30 year lease- so there may have been reasonable reliance, particularly if garage improved property. (perhaps it was already built, we dunno)
This is not a UCC K, it's not for the sale of goods. Trade usage evidence might be admissable.
Do we have another term of K which deals with destruction of ppty by other means, fire, etc.
Do other people's K's include condemnation clauses, then we might say these people deliberately left it out.
Not all form Ks are adhesion Ks.

IMPLIED OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH: one party claims to be acting in accordance w/K but other party sez; Nuh uh.
Not just honesty but general fair dealing, no sneakiness! So: no concealing defect in what you're selling, no failing to perform in full, no abusing bargaining power to get increase in K price, no hiring a broker and then preventing from completing deal, have to mitigate other party's damages, just terminating K for no good reason, harassing other party, etc. Like if I tell someone I'm single- technically true but not true for purposes of dating.

Seidenberg v. Summit Bank.
Pls sold companies to Summit bank and placed shares in escrow to take care of remaining liabilities. Pls agreed to work for Summit as executives of brokerage firms. Pls then alleged that Summit did not work cooperatively with them. They didn't get salary increases, terminated from positions.
Lower ct said: this wasn't a good faith claim; they were seeking enforcement of an oral agreement beyond four corners of written agreement, violating parol evidence rule. AND these folks were no dummies. They coulda had everything written down that they wanted/needed.
This ct sez; well, they shoulda known what they were doing, but that's not determinative. And parol evidence doesn't come into play here 'cos doesn't apply to good faith.
Good faith has three ways:
permits inclusion of terms and conditions not in written contract.
Allows for redress of bad faith even if no express term breached
permits inquiry into a party's exercise of discretion expressly granted by a contract's terms.
We can't override express terms in K w/ good faith
Long boring discussion.
Reversed and remanded to trier of fact


Morin Building v. Baystone Construction

GM hired Baystone hired Morin to build Chevy plant, Morin installed siding that GM found unsatisfactory artistic effect. Morin sued Baystone when not paid, affirmed.

Issue was jury instruction, can we say that satisfaction has to meet an objective standard- not whether the owner WAS satisfied but whether they SHOULD have been satisfied?

Two standards for satisfaction, subjective, only if explicitly mentioned in K, and in this case, artistic effect mentioned as "if w/in terms of K Document" so ct said, nope, they didn't expressly state subjective test, per restatement we prefer to use objective test NEwa. so judgment for Morin affirmed.

Locke v. Warner Bros.

WB writes Locke K to make movies to get her off Eastwood's back. WB won't make her movies. She sues for Good Faith Lower ct sez; WB had artistic discretion for WB, this ct sez; yah but they still could be in bad faith per other execs statements.


Donahue v. FedEx. Donahue discovered much wrongdoing by supervisor, fake invoices, etc, fired. Appeals, citing FedEx's Guaranteeed Fair Treatment Procedure. Ct. sez; good faith applies to K part of employer-employee relationship. D is at will employee, so no K. GFTP expressly states; not a K

Whistle blower firing by private employer A-Ok by us. Additional consideration by employee, moving etc., can overcome at will status, but it's not present here.

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